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Overview 
 
This research note updates selected charts from three previous papers (Bichler and Nitzan 2012, 2015, 
2017). The new data present a rather startling picture, suggesting that the Middle East – and the global 
political economy more generally – might face an important crossroads.  
Our assessment here rests on the analysis of capital as power, or CasP. Beginning in the late 1980s, 
we suggested that, since the late 1960s, the Middle East was greatly influenced by the capitalized power 
of a Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition – a loose coalition comprising the leading oil companies, the 
OPEC cartel, armament contractors, engineering firms and large financial institutions – whose differ-
ential accumulation benefitted from and in turn helped fuel and sustain Middle East ‘energy conflicts’.2 
These conflicts, we argued, reverberated far beyond the region: they affected the ups and downs of 
global growth, the gyrations of inflation and, in some important respects, the very evolution of the cap-
italist mode of power.3 And this impact, it seems to us, is now being called into question.  
Historically, the main force holding the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition together was the price 
of oil, and over the past few years, this price – along with the Coalition’s revenues and profits – has 
fallen perceptibly. Judging by past patterns, this massive collapse should have triggered a significant en-
ergy conflict, leading to sharply higher oil prices, soaring petroleum revenues and the rapid build-up of 
oil profits. So far, though, none of this has happened. The region is replete with hotspots, but these have 
not developed into a major war capable of arresting, let alone reversing, the Coalition’s downward 
spiral.  
In our view, the decline of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition mirrors several related pro-
cesses. The first is the broader descent of the U.S., a process that makes it more difficult for the U.S. 
government – traditionally the main bulwark of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition – to sustain 
and manage Middle East energy conflicts. The second is the ascent of a global Technodollar Coalition, a 
constellation of capitalist interests concentrated primarily in information, communication, automation 
and biotechnology whose members are highly averse to oil crises, stagflation and regime change – the 
very processes that make the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition tick. And the third is rising ecological 
concerns associated with climate change/peak oil and the growing realization that humanity is bound 
to reduce its reliance on fossil fuel in general and petroleum in particular. 
                                                          
1 This paper is titled after Lev Nussimbaum’s gripping novel Blood and Oil in the Orient (Bey 1932). Shimshon Bichler 
teaches political economy at colleges and universities in Israel. Jonathan Nitzan teaches political economy at York 
University in Canada. All of their publications are available for free on The Bichler & Nitzan Archives (http://bnar-
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3 Cf. Bichler and Nitzan (1995), Nitzan (1996), Nitzan and Bichler (2001), Bichler and Nitzan (2004) and Bichler 
and Nitzan (2006). 
2 
Paradoxically, though, these counterforces are unlikely to pacify the Middle East any time soon. 
First, although the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition is down, it is by no means out. Given the mas-
sive collapse of its earnings, it needs higher oil prices more than ever before; and this urgent requirement 
means that a major Middle East conflict – for example, a direct or proxy war between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran (with or without backing from other countries) – remains a distinct possibility. But even if the 
Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition does not have its way – i.e., even if inter-state conflict in the region 
remains contained or otherwise fails to prop up the price of oil – the Middle East is unlikely to quiet 
down. Many of the region’s autocratic regimes have already disintegrated or face the prospect of disin-
tegration, and the slump in oil prices and earnings is bound to hasten this process even further.  
 
1. Clear and Present Danger 
 
Begin with income. Figure 1 contrasts the net profits of the large oil companies, approximated here by 
a Petro-Core of leading publicly listed firms, with the export revenues of OPEC (both expressed in 2016 
prices). And as the data show, the two groups face a serious threat. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. OPEC and the Petro-Core 
 
NOTE: Series show annual data. The Petro-Core consists of British Petroleum (BP-Amoco since 1998), Chevron 
(with Texaco since 2001), Exxon (ExxonMobil since 1999), Mobil (till 1998), Royal-Dutch/Shell and Texaco (till 
2000). Company changes are due to mergers. Data are deflated by the U.S. implicit price deflator. The last data 
points are for 2016.  
 
SOURCE: Updated from Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, ‘Still About Oil?’ Real-World Economics Review, 
No. 70 (February), 2015, Figure 2, p. 10. OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2016, Table 2.5: OPEC Members’ 
Values of Petroleum Exports (for OPEC’s petroleum exports). U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis through Data Insight (series code: PDIGDP for the U.S. GDP deflator). Fortune and Compustat 
through WRDS (for the Petro-Core’s net profit). 
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Over the past few years, the Petro-Core has seen its net profit plummet by over 90 per cent, falling 
from record highs in the early 2010s to lows last seen in the 1950s. The situation for OPEC is not much 
better. The organization’s overall petroleum exports, which reached record levels in the early 2010s, are 
now down by nearly two-thirds. The impact of this decline is greatly exacerbated by the organization’s 
rapid population growth – roughly 350 per cent over the past 55 years. Taking this latter growth into 
account means that, on a per capita basis, oil exports, expressed in constant dollars, are now back to 
where they were in the early 1970s, before the first oil crisis.  
Clearly, this situation is unsustainable. To recover, the oil companies and oil exporting countries 
must see their incomes rise significantly. And such a recovery, if it were to happen, would require higher 
oil prices.  
 
2. The Price Pivot 
 
Indeed, when it comes to changes in global oil profits and petroleum export revenues, the volume of oil 
production matters little. The key is variations in price.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Differential Earnings per Share and the Relative Price of Crude Oil  
 
NOTE: Series show monthly data smoothed as 12-month trailing averages. EPS denotes earnings per share and is 
calculated by dividing the stock price index by the price-earnings ratio. Differential EPS is calculated by dividing 
the EPS of the integrated oil index by the EPS of the world index. The relative price of oil is the average crude price 
deflated by the U.S. CPI. The last data points are October 2017 for the differential EPS and September 2017 (Sept 
2018 lagged) for the relative price of oil. 
                                                          
4 Unlike the highly volatile price of oil, the global volume of oil production tends to rise rather gradually and with 
relatively small short-term oscillations. 
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SOURCE: Updated from Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, ‘Still About Oil?’ Real-World Economics Review, 
No. 70 (February), 2015, Figure 3, p. 12. Datastream (series codes: TOTMKWD(PI) and TOTMKWD(PE) for the 
price index and price-earnings ratio of all listed firms, respectively; OILINWD(PI) and OILINWD(PE) for the 
price index and price-earnings ratio of all listed integrated oil firms, respectively). IMF International Financial 
Statistics through Data Insight (series codes: L76AA&Z@C001 for the average price of crude oil; L64@C111for 
the U.S. CPI). 
 
Figure 2 illustrates this latter impact. The chart contrasts the differential earnings per share (EPS) 
of the global integrated oil sector (i.e., the sector’s EPS relative to the world’s EPS) with the relative 
price of oil 12 months earlier (dollars per barrel deflated by the U.S. CPI).5 It shows that, for nearly half 
a century, the correlation between the two series has been positive, tight and highly persistent (Pearson 
Coefficient = +0.76). And this pattern continues to hold today: over the past five years, the relative price 
of oil fell by 55 per cent, while the oil companies’ differential EPS sank by 71 per cent. 
Note, though, that in the last few months, both series show a small uptick. Could this uptick be the 
inflection point the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition has been anxiously waiting for? The answer is 
likely to depend crucially on future hostilities in the region. 
 
3. Differential Earnings and Energy Conflicts 
 
As we have seen, higher differential profitability requires rising relative oil prices; and as we shall now 
show, historically, relative oil prices tended to increase on the back of Middle East energy conflicts.  
Figure 3 demonstrates this relationship. The chart plots the differential return on equity of the Petro-
Core relative to the Fortune 500: when the bars are grey, the Petro-Core beats the average (having a 
higher return on equity than the Fortune 500); when the bars are black, it trails the average (showing 
lower returns than the Fortune 500). These latter periods denote ‘danger zones’, indicating that the region 
is ripe for a new energy conflict. The actual eruption of such conflicts is marked by an explosion sign.  
The figure paints three important regularities: 
 
1. Every energy conflict save one was preceded by the Petro-Core trailing the average. In other words, 
for a Middle East energy conflict to erupt, the large oil companies first have to differentially decu-
mulate (trail the average).6 The sole exception to this rule was the 2011 burst of the Arab Spring 
and the subsequent blooming of ‘outsourced wars’.7 This round erupted without prior differential 
decumulation – although the Petro-Core was very close to falling below the average. In 2010, its 
differential return on equity dropped to a mere 3.3 per cent, down from 71.5 per cent in 2009 and a 
whopping 1,114 per cent in 2008.8  
 
2. Until 2014 – a crucial turning point to which we turn in Section 4 – every energy conflict was 
followed by the oil companies beating the average.9 As we have seen, differential oil profits are 
intimately correlated with the relative price of oil; the relative price of oil in turn is highly responsive 
                                                          
5 The reason for the time lag is that ‘current’ EPS represents earnings recorded over the past year. 
6 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, and again during the 2000s, differential decumulation was sometimes followed 
by a string of conflicts stretching over several years. In these instances, the result was a longer time lag between the 
initial spell of differential decumulation and some of the subsequent conflicts. 
7 Our term for the ongoing fighting in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, which is financed and supported by a multitude of 
governments and organizations in and outside the region. 
8 The disproportionately high values for 2002 (+426%), 2007 (+892%) and 2008 (+1,114%) are due to the Fortune 
500’s very low rates of return in those years. 
9 It is important to note here that the energy conflicts have led not to higher oil profits as such, but to higher differ-
ential oil profits. For example, in 1969-70, 1975, 1980-82, 1985, 1991, 2001-02, 2006-07, 2009 and 2012, the rate of 
return on equity of the Petro-Core actually fell; but in all cases the fall was either slower than that of the Fortune 500 
or too small to close the positive gap between them, so despite the absolute decline, the Petro-Core continued to 
beat the average (see also Figure 4 below). 
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to Middle East risk perceptions, real or imaginary; these risk perceptions tend to jump in prepara-
tion for and during armed conflict; and as risks mount, they raise the relative price of oil and boost 
the differential returns of the oil companies. 
 
3. With one exception, in 1996-97, the Petro-Core never managed to beat the average without a re-
gional energy conflict.10 In other words, the differential performance of the oil companies depended 
not on production, but on the most extreme form of sabotage: war.11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Energy Conflicts and Differential Profits: The Petro-Core vs. the Fortune 500  
 
* Return on equity is the ratio of net profit to owners’ equity. Differential return on equity is the difference between 
the return on equity of the Petro-Core and of the Fortune 500, expressed as a per cent of the return on equity of the 
Fortune 500. For 1992-93, data for Fortune 500 companies are reported without SFAS 106 special charges. The last 
data point is for 2016.  
 
NOTE: The Petro-Core consists of British Petroleum (BP-Amoco since 1998), Chevron (with Texaco since 2001), 
Exxon (ExxonMobil since 1999), Mobil (till 1998), Royal-Dutch/Shell and Texaco (till 2000). Company changes 
are due to mergers. Energy Conflicts mark the starting points of: the 1967 Arab-Israel war; the 1973 Arab-Israel 
war; the 1979 Iranian Revolution; the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; the 1980 Iran-Iraq War; the 1982 sec-
ond Israeli invasion of Lebanon; the 1990-91 first Gulf War; the 2000 second Palestinian Intifada; the 2001 attack 
of 9/11, the launching of the ‘War on Terror’ and the invasion of Afghanistan; the 2002-3 second Gulf War; the 
2011 Arab Spring and outsourced wars; the 2014 third Gulf War.  
                                                          
10 Although there was no official conflict in 1996-97, there was plenty of violence, including an Iraqi invasion of 
Kurdish areas and U.S. cruise missile attacks (‘Operation Desert Strike’). 
11 For the details underlying the individual energy conflicts, as well as a broader discussion of the entire process, 
see Bichler and Nitzan (1996), Nitzan and Bichler (2002: Ch. 5), Bichler and Nitzan (2004) and Nitzan and Bichler 
(2006). 
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SOURCE: Updated from Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, ‘Still About Oil?’ Real-World Economics Review, 
No. 70 (February), 2015, Figure 4, p. 16. Fortune; Compustat through WRDS. 
 
 
These regularities also seem to hold in Figure 4, where we focus not on the United States, but on 
the world as a whole; look not at the return on equity, but at the growth of earnings per share (EPS); 
and examine not annual but monthly data.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Energy Conflicts and Differential Profits: Integrated Oil Companies vs. the World 
 
NOTE: Series show monthly data smoothed as three-year trailing averages. Earnings per share (EPS) are calculated 
by dividing the stock price index by the price-earnings ratio. The annual rate of change is measured relative to the 
corresponding month in the previous year. Differential EPS growth is calculated by subtracting the EPS growth 
rate of the world index from the EPS growth rate of the integrated oil index. The last data points are for October 
2017. 
 
SOURCE: Updated from Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, ‘Still About Oil?’ Real-World Economics Review, 
No. 70 (February), 2015, Figure 5 p. 18. Datastream (series codes: TOTMKWD(PI) and TOTMKWD(PE) for the 
price index and price-earnings ratio of all listed firms, respectively; OILINWD(PI) and OILINWD(PE) for the 
price index and price-earnings ratio of all listed integrated oil firms, respectively). 
 
The top two series contrast the average EPS performance of the world’s listed integrated oil com-
panies with the average EPS performance of all of the world’s listed companies. Each series measures 
the annual rate of change of the respective EPS, computed by comparing any given month with the 
same month a year earlier and expressed as a three-year trailing average. The bottom series shows the 
differential EPS growth of the integrated oil companies, computed by subtracting the EPS growth rates 
of the world index from the EPS growth rate of the integrated oil index and expressing the result as a 
three-year trailing average. As in Figure 3, grey areas indicate periods during which the integrated oil 
companies beat the average, while black areas show periods in which they trail the average (and there-
fore mark a danger zone).  
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Now although the definition and scope of these indices are rather different than those in Figure 3, 
the three stylized patterns – as well as the exceptions to these patters – are almost the same. Similarly 
to Figure 3, the chart shows that, since 1976: (1) all energy conflicts were preceded by the world’s inte-
grated oil companies trailing the average (with the exception of the 2011 Arab Spring/outsourced wars 
and the 2014 third Gulf War, when differential accumulation was very close to zero, but still positive); 
(2) with the exception of the third Gulf war, all conflicts were followed by the integrated oil companies 
shifting to differential accumulation; and (3) except for the mid-1990s, the integrated oil companies 
have never managed to beat the average without a prior energy conflict. 
 
4. The Current Crossroads 12 
 
Situated against these long-term regularities, the experience of the past three years is highly exceptional. 
In line with the first regularity, the danger zone that opened up in 2013 was dully followed by the 2014 
onset of the so-called third Gulf War. But then, for the first time in half a century, the first regularity 
was not followed by the second. Despite the ongoing hostilities – in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, among other 
places – and notwithstanding mounting regional instabilities hastened by dwindling petroleum export 
revenues, oil prices have plummeted, and the oil companies continue to trail the average. Moreover – 
and ominously – the magnitudes of the price drops and differential losses are unprecedented. 
What do these latest developments mean for the Middle East and the global political economy more 
generally? In our view, the answer might depend crucially on the conflict within the global ruling class. 
The potential significance of such intra-class conflicts was illustrated half a century ago by Michael 
Kalecki (1964, 1967). According to Kalecki, the fate of U.S. involvement in Vietnam – and, by exten-
sion, the evolution of the U.S. political economy more generally – hinged on a clash between the ‘old’, 
largely civilian business groups located mainly on the East Coast, whose interests did not sit well with 
U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and the ‘new’ militarized business concerns, primarily the arms contrac-
tors of the West Coast, that thrived on it. 
Is there a similar intra-class conflict affecting the ebb and flow of Middle East wars? To contextu-
alize this question, consider Figure 5, where we juxtapose two global coalitions: the Weapondollar-
Petrodollar cluster, made up of listed integrated oil and defence corporations, and the Technodollar Coa-
lition, comprising listed technology firms, both hardware and software. Each series measures the market 
capitalization of the relevant coalition, expressed as a per cent share of the global market capitalization 
of all listed firms. 
The figure shows a clear inverse relationship: since the mid-1970s, the global market capitalization 
shares of the two coalitions have moved in opposite directions (with only a brief exception in 1985-90). 
Now, since relative capitalization reflects differential profit expectations and risk assessments, and since 
these expectations and assessments hinge on the broader trajectories of the global political economy, 
one can argue there is an inherent conflict between these two coalitions: conditions that favour one coa-
lition undermine the other, and vice versa.  
The significance of this structural conflict is best assessed in historical retrospect. The classical im-
perialism of the early twentieth century was spearheaded by the leading oil companies, whose activities 
dominated and often dictated the foreign policies of the old powers. In the wake of the First World War, 
these companies helped draft various regional agreements – from Sykes-Picot (1916), San Remo (1920) 
and Cairo (1921) to Red Line (1928) and Achnacarry (1928) – carving and shaping the Middle East in 
line with their own interests. During that period, their main concern was the ‘free flow’ of oil – i.e., 
political stability, open access to oil at low prices and minimal royalties to the region’s rulers.  
 
  
                                                          
12 Sections 4 and 5 extend and develop the argument made in Bichler and Nitzan (2017: Section 11). 
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Figure 5. Shares of Global Market Capitalization  
 
NOTE: Series denote monthly data shown as 12-month trailing averages. The last data points are for October 2017. 
 
SOURCE: Updated from Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, ‘Arms and Oil in the Middle East: A Biography 
of Research’, Working Papers on Capital as Power (2017/04, August), Figure 4, p. 17. Datastream (series codes: TOT-
MKWD for world total, OILINWD for integrated oil; AERSPWD for defense; TECNOWD for technology). 
 
This free-flow era ended in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The demise of imperialism undermined 
the oil companies’ former autonomy. Instead of calling the shots, they now had to negotiate and align 
with oil-producing oligarchies, elements in their own parent governments and armed forces, and other 
corporate coalitions, particularly in armament and finance. The centre of this complex network was the 
Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition. Unlike during the free-flow era, the interests of this coalition now 
lay in limiting the flow of oil. The main purpose was to raise the price of oil to boost oil incomes on the 
one hand and augment military spending and arms exports into the region on the other. And that goal 
was best served by a divide-and-rule strategy that kept the Middle East embroiled in a never-ending 
string of managed energy conflicts, stoked the Cold War and the arms race and pushed the world into 
reoccurring stagflation crises. 
In the 1990s, though, the capitalist mode of power was again transformed. First, the end of the Cold 
War accentuated the gradual decline of the United States and the former Soviet Union relative the 
former periphery, particularly in Asia. Second, the ongoing global wave of corporate mergers and ac-
quisitions gave rise to a new and highly complex power hierarchy of giant transnational corporations 
whose activities, although deeply embedded in state structures, gradually work to undermine the very 
notion of ‘state sovereignty’. Third, and crucially, the pivotal political-economic role of oil has been 
challenged by the dual threats of peak oil and climate change, the development of renewable alternatives 
9 
and, most importantly, the emergence of new power hierarchies built not on raw materials, but infor-
mation – hence the Technodollar Coalition.  
The rise of this new, information-based power is illustrated in Figure 5. Between 1990 and 2000, 
the global market capitalization of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition continued its long-term 
slide, hitting a record low of 4 per cent of the total in 2000, down from 14 per cent in 1980. By contrast, 
the market capitalization of the Technodollar Coalition more than quadrupled – rising to 21 per cent of 
the total in 2000, up from a mere 5 per cent in 1990.  
In the early 2000s, the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition embarked on a last-ditch attempt to 
resurrect its capitalized power, pushing the U.S. White House toward yet another Gulf War. And for a 
while, the effort succeeded: the Technodollar Coalition’s market capitalization dropped to a mere 7 per 
cent of the total – the experts called it a ‘burst bubble’ – while the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition’s 
share doubled to 8 per cent.  
This comeback, though, was partial and short-lived. In 2010, with the Middle East still in flames 
and the analysts predicting the imminent arrival of peak oil, the price of oil started to plummet. And as 
the plunge continued, the market capitalization of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition again fell 
below 5 per cent of the total, while that of the Technodollar Coalition resumed its uptrend. 
 
5. There Will be Blood 
 
On the face of it, then, the cards seemed stacked against the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition. The 
capitalized ascent of the Technodollar Coalition since the 1990s reflects its tightening grip over the 
hearts, minds and everyday lives of the global population, as well as its increasing informational and 
ideological symbiosis with governmental and military organs. And this fusion makes it harder for the 
Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition to stir global politics in general and Middle Eastern affairs in par-
ticular – certainly in comparison to the 1970s and 1980s. 
Moreover, the U.S. government – historically the principal backer of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar 
Coalition – might find it increasingly difficult to support the interests of this coalition, even if it wanted 
to. Of course, Washington can still instigate a major conflict in the region, but it can no longer easily 
manage it – certainly not on its own. To do so, it needs the support and cooperation of allies and vassals, 
and that support and cooperation, which seemed relatively easy to master in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
can no longer be taken for granted.  
This difficulty is part and parcel of the capitalized decline of the United States, evident in Figure 6. 
The chart contrasts the shares of global profit earned by corporations listed in the United States with 
those listed in other developed markets as well as the rest of the world (developing countries). The data 
show that U.S.-listed firms currently appropriate only 30 per cent of all global profit, down from 60 per 
cent in the 1970s and 1980s – a decline mirrored partly by the rising share of firms listed in other devel-
oped markets, but mostly by the rapid growth of firms listed in the former periphery, primarily in Asia.  
This dual decline, though, will probably do little to pacify the Middle East. With the Weapondollar-
Petrodollar Coalition now a shadow of its former self, and with the U.S. government increasingly re-
luctant and decreasingly able to manage shifting alliances and inter-state conflict in the region, ‘mini 
powers’ such as Turkey and Iran, along with Russia, have stepped into the void, trying to realign their 
positions and expand their regional spheres of influence. These realignments and expansions, though, 
are likely to remain volatile and unstable, primarily because the inner state structures of the region, 
erected after the First World War, are now crumbling. The states of Algeria, Libya, Sudan, Iraq, Syria, 
Lebanon and Yemen have all failed, while others, such Saudi Arabia’s, Egypt’s and Iran’s, face mount-
ing inner challenges to their legitimacy.  
In this volatile context, with the oil and armament companies, the region’s oil-exporting autocracies 
and various non-state groups all keen on seeing their oil incomes rise, the prospects of a new energy 
conflict, whether premeditated or coincidental, seem extremely high.  
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Figure 6: Net Profit Shares of Listed Corporations (per cent of world total) 
 
NOTE: Net profit is computed as the ratio of market value to the price-earnings ratio. Data for developed markets 
excluding the U.S. is calculated by subtracting from the profit of firms listed in developed markets the profit of firms 
listed in the U.S. Data for rest of the world is calculated by subtracting from the profit of all firms the profit of those 
listed in developed markets. Series display monthly data and are smoothed as 12-month moving averages. The raw 
earning data are reported on a consolidated basis, including domestic and foreign subsidiaries and the equity share 
in minority held firms. The last data points are for October 2017. 
 
SOURCE: Updated from Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, ‘Imperialism and Financialism: The Story of a 
Nexus’, Journal of Critical Globalization Studies, No. 5, January, 2012, Figure 3, p. 59. Datastream (series code: 
TOTMKWD(MV) and TOTMKWD(PE) for the market value and price-earnings ratio of all listed firms, 
respectively; TOTMKUS(MV) and TOTMKUS(PE) for the market value and price-earnings ratio of U.S.-listed 
firms, respectively; TOTMKDV(MV) and TOTMKDV(PE) for the market value and price-earnings ratio of firms 
listed in developed countries, respectively). 
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